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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES VII INTRODUCTION
Margaret A. Berger*
The Journal of Law and Policy is once again privileged to
publish extended versions of papers relating to science and law that
were presented at a conference for federal and state judges. 1 The
conference, which took place at Brooklyn Law School on March 3
and 4, 2006, was the seventh in a series of Science for Judges
programs funded by the Common Benefit Trust established in the
Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation. It was held
under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for Health,
Science and Public Policy in collaboration with the Federal
Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, and the
Committee on Science, Technology and Law of the National
Academies of Science.
Four of the articles that follow deal with a central concern of
the Science for Judges program from its inception—the proof of
causation in toxic tort litigation. It is certainly not surprising that
this topic was addressed at several of the earlier conferences. 2 The
*

Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Professor Berger is the Director of the Science for Judges Program.
1
Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found in 12 J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 1-53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and the
science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485-639
(2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1179 (2005) (papers iscussing the integrity of scientific research and forensic
evidence in criminal proceedings); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 499-647 (2005) (papers
discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research); and 14 J.L. & POL’Y 1209 (2006) (papers discussing risk assessment dealing with expert proof of
causation in toxic tort cases and issues relevant to the availability of data). All
papers are available in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/
centers/scienceforjudges/papers.php.
2
See David Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts—A Primer In
Toxicology For Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L & POL’Y 5 (2003); Douglas Weed,

1

BERGER_INTRO

2

3/22/2007 5:19 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

problem of proving causation—which is usually at the heart of
toxic tort cases—is undoubtedly a direct cause of the Science for
Judges programs. Training judges to understand complex scientific
concepts took on a new urgency after the United States Supreme
Court’s 1993 opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 3 required trial judges to make a preliminary finding that
proffered scientific expert testimony was reliable and relevant
before it could be admitted. Daubert was a toxic tort case in which
the contested crucial issue was causation, as was General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 4 the second case in which the Court explored criteria
for the admissibility of expert proof. So from the first, the trial
judge’s role as “gatekeeper” in admitting expert testimony was
intertwined with rulings on expert testimony offered to prove that
defendant’s product caused plaintiff’s alleged adverse health
effect.
The emphasis on causation at these programs is not, however,
due solely to the historical connection between Daubert and
Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J.L. & POL’Y 43
(2003); John Concato, Overview Of Research Design In Epidemiology, 12 J.L &
POL’Y 489 (2004); John Ionnides & Joseph Lau, Systematic Review of Medical
Evidence, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 509 (2004); James Robins, Should Compensation
Schemes Be Based On The Probability Of Causation Or Expected Years Of Life
Lost?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 537 (2004); Jeanne Stellman & Steven Stellman,
Characterization of Exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam Veterans as a Basis
for Epidemiological Studies, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 505 (2005); David Butler,
Connections: The Early History of Scientific and Medical Research on “Agent
Orange,” 13 J.L. & POL’Y 527 (2005); Irva Hertz-Picciotto, How Scientists View
Causality and Assess Evidence: A Study of the Institute of Medicine’s
Evaluation of Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange, 13 J.L. &
POL’Y 553 (2005); Joseph Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation In Humans
Exposed To Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. POL’Y 39 (2005); Gary Marchant, Genetic
Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling,
Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65 (2005).
3
509 U.S. 579 (1998).
4
522 U.S. 136 (1997). The third case in which the Supreme Court
considered the admissibility of expert proof, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999), turned on causation in a products liability action that did
not involve a toxic tort. See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy
on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000).
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educational scientific programs for judges. Proving causation in
toxic tort cases would have been a core part of any judicial
curriculum on science even if the Supreme Court’s new rule for
admitting expert testimony had been handed down in a case having
nothing to do with toxic torts. And that, of course, is because
determining causation is such a difficult, complex issue. Any
decision is beset by uncertainty because our comprehension of
disease processes is far from complete. Determining whether a
particular expert may testify about causation remains a highly
demanding task for judges. As the reader of these essays will see,
deciding issues about causation is equally challenging for
scientists.
It is, therefore, gratifying to introduce articles by four eminent
experts whose research is at the cutting edge of understanding and
explaining causal claims. The principal message that emerges from
their papers is that determining disease causality requires
judgment; science at this point in time cannot often offer a
definitive, clear-cut answer. In addition, all the authors, some more
explicitly than others, are critical of some of the underlying
assumptions that can be found in some judicial opinions as
inconsistent with scientific reasoning.
The first paper, by Carl Cranor, a professor of philosophy,
focuses first on what is known about chemicals and then on the
structure of scientific arguments. 5 Professor Cranor explains that
drawing non-deductive inferences means that gaps in arguments
will always be encountered, but that methods exist for drawing the
best-supported conclusion. He stresses that scientists typically
consider all relevant data in order to assess the strength of the
available evidence, and gives examples of how pieces of data may
fit together to produce a conclusion. The Supreme Court’s Joiner 6
opinion has been read by some courts as requiring judges to pass
individually on the reliability of each study on which an expert
seeks to rely rather than considering them as a whole. Professor
Cranor’s paper raises interesting issues about whether a separatist

5

Carl F. Cranor, A Framework for Assessing Scientific Arguments: Gaps,
Relevance and Integrated Evidence, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 7 (2006).
6
Supra, note 4.
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approach comports with scientific practice.
Drs. Melnick and Bucher are toxicologists at the National
Toxicology Program at the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences. 7 Their paper provides a valuable overview of
how toxicological studies have been used in making public health
decisions, how they are designed, and how they are combined with
other data, such as epidemiological studies. For judges handling
toxic tort cases, perhaps the most useful discussion appears in
Section III on Evaluation Issues. It suggests that courts may be out
of touch with current research when they ignore animal studies as
irrelevant because they do not relate to humans and expose animals
to higher doses than those administered to persons. Toxicological
studies have been gathering mechanistic data comparing the
metabolizing of particular chemicals in humans and animals. These
studies show that extrapolation to humans may be appropriate in
certain cases, explain why adverse reactions to a particular
substance may sometimes be observable in species, like mice, but
not in others like rats, and reveal that the sites of tumors in animals
may not always correspond to those in humans. Section IV of the
Melnick-Bucher article explains how dose-response data from
animal studies are converted to human equivalent doses. This is a
paper which presents toxicology as an evolving experimental
science that will undoubtedly play an increasingly important role
in determining disease causality.
The next two papers focus on epidemiology. Dr. Steven N.
Goodman’s thesis is that the determination of causal claims in
toxic tort cases is often “left to a formulaic misapplication of what
are regarded as scientific criteria for proof.” 8 He first takes on
traditional, frequentist statistics which he criticizes for producing
results that on average may be correct but terribly wrong in a
particular case. Next he explores Bayesian statistics and the
difficulty of calculating the prior probability needed for a Bayesian
analysis, and then turns to instances in which insisting on a relative
risk greater than 2 to prove specific causation leads to invalid
7

Ronald L. Melnick & John R. Bucher, Determining Disease Causality
from Experimental Toxicology Studies, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 111 (2006).
8
Steven N. Goodman, Judgment for Judges: What Traditional Statistics
Don’t Tell You About Causal Claims, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 92, 92 (2006).
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results. He concludes that “the truth of causal claims is not
calculable from the data alone,” 9 and instead proposes principles
that judges should use in determining general and specific
causation in toxic tort cases. His recommendations require
judgment, a close look at prior studies and the strength of their
design and implementation, and careful attention to biologic
principles.
Dr. Douglas Weed’s article explores the nature of scientific
judgment in depth. 10 He explains why it is needed and examines
the various essential functions expert judgment performs, although
he concedes that the exact nature of judgment is complex and
elusive. Dr. Weed provides a brief philosophical tour of a variety
of values and criteria that have been proposed as attributes of
scientific inquiry, and concludes by setting out a taxonomy of
different types of judgment. He stresses the importance of not only
assessing the outcome of a judgment but also of appraising the
process by which judgments about causal claims are reached.
Exercising judgment, is of course, what judges do. Although it
may be disturbing that there is no magic formula for determining
the validity of a causal claim, it may also be reassuring to be
reminded that legal and scientific reasoning share some of the
same attributes: careful attention to relevant facts and how they are
derived, understanding what is sought to be proved, assessing
probative value, and being mindful of biases.
The fifth article that appears in this volume of the Journal of
Law and Policy deals with a very different, but equally significant
topic at the intersection of science and the law: the operation of
forensic laboratories. 11 Here, too, Daubert has played a significant
9

Id. at 104.
Douglas L. Weed, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Judgment, 15 J.
L.& POL’Y 132 (2006).
11
Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating Crime Laboratories: The Impact of DNA
Evidence, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 58 (2006). Presentations by Peter Neufeld, Esq., a
co-director of the Innocence Project, William A. Gardner, Executive Director of
the American Registry of Pathology, and Timothy P. McMahon, Ph.D.,
Supervisor of Validation and Quality Control Armed Forces DNA Identification
Laboratory, three of the other speakers at the session on Forensic Laboratories:
Current Issues and Standards at the Science for Judges VII conference may be
10
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role. The article by Professor Paul Giannelli of Case Western
Reserve University Law School, who has long sought to alert the
legal community about the deplorable state of many forensic
laboratories, 12 concludes that significant reforms are finally in the
offing. After a brief survey of the early history of American crime
laboratories, he turns to developments in the 70’s and 80’s. He
then discusses in greater detail DNA evidence’s revolutionary
impact on forensic science, and comments on the effect the
Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert is beginning to have on
rethinking the admissibility of traditional forensic evidence that
had never previously been challenged. In addition, Professor
Giannelli examines pending initiatives of the American Bar
Association that bear on reforms pertaining to crime labs. It
appears that we are on the verge of important changes in the
handling of scientific evidence in criminal cases.
I hope these highly abbreviated summaries whet your interest
in reading the sophisticated, cutting-edge articles that follow.
Understanding scientific principles and process is of the utmost
importance to judges and lawyers: life and death outcomes and
vast amounts of money not infrequently turn on issues relating to
scientific proof.

viewed at http://www.brooklaw.edu/centers/ scienceforjudges/events.php (click
on video under the Science for Judges VII listing).
12
See, e.g., The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials:
The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST.L.J. 671 (1988).

